[Bear
with me through Parts 1 & 2 as we set the stage for the Revelation in Part
3. While, initially, this may seem to be nothing more than an exploration of the
hallmark case of The Bermuda Triangle, it has a direct link to a blackmark on Western Historical Research. Now, dig in, as I’ve been putting this together for
a long time, a lotta work here and the revelation, well, stay with me, you’ll
see.]
Date: December 5, 1945, 2:10
p.m.
Location:
Naval Air Station [NAS] Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
Mission:
Flight 19 comprised of 5 Avenger torpedo bombers crewed by 14 men head east
over the Atlantic.
This
is a training mission for the crews in the last stages of the training curricula.
The
mission is headed by the more experienced Lt. Charles Taylor; the other 4
pilots possess less experience than Lt. Taylor.
Note:
The 5 pilots had been recently transferred from the Keys, which they knew well.
This mission was to take them towards the Bahamas over ocean they were less familiar
with.
Mission Purpose: Practice bombing run at Hens and Chicken Shoals which lie 56
miles off the east coast of Florida.
Flight Path:
56 miles to the target, then continue eastward for an additional 67 miles, then
north for 73 miles, then bear west southwest for 120 miles to return to the NAS
in Fort Lauderdale.
Plotted
on the map, the flight path is triangular.
3:40 p.m.
Lt.
Robert Cox, pilot and flight instructor on another run, is about to land at the
NAS in Fort Lauderdale when he overheard a radio transmission addressed to
someone named Powers. [Powers was Captain Edward Powers, one of the Flight 19
pilots.]
Lt.
Cox overheard Capt. Powers reply: “I don’t know where we are. We must have
got lost after that last turn.”
Lt.
Cox heard no immediate reply to Capt. Powers, so he established contact with
Lt. Taylor, the Flight Leader, the man heard by Cox contacting Powers in the initial
message.
Taylor
told Lt. Cox that his compasses were not working and “I’m sure I’m in the
Keys, but…I don’t know how to get to Fort Lauderdale.”
Lt.
Cox not knowing Flight 19’s flight plan and assuming Lt. Taylor was correct
advised: “If you are in the Keys fly north.”
Note:
Lt. Taylor was mistaken. Flight 19 was not in the Keys. That was not part of their
flight plan. Fort Lauderdale is 90 miles North of the Keys. No part of their triangular
flight plan has them bearing South until well after the 140 miles eastward trek
of the bombing and post bombing run.
Lt.
Taylor, unfamiliar with the Bahamas is presumed to have mistaken this location
for the Keys.
Lt.
Cox, acting on good faith, advised the Northward turn.
When
Lt. Taylor compounded the error of location with a turn northward from the Bahamas
he would be leading the crews further out to sea.
Lt.
Taylor was not necessarily operating incompetently. Spotty transmissions and
poor communications were compounding the situation.
Overheard
communications amongst the Flight 19 crews reveal dissension with Lt. Taylor’s “We’re
in the Keys, let’s fly North” assessment.
The
dissension rose to a point where the crews were urging Lt. Taylor to turn over
command to one of the other student pilots.
He
refused.
4:30 p.m.
Lt.
Taylor radios a question that is received by the Port Everglades Boat Facility,
an Air Sea Rescue Unit near Fort Lauderdale.
The
question they received was: “Do you think, as my student does, that we should
fly west?”
The
Port Everglades Boat Facility, not knowing Flight 19’s location does not advise
on course and simply logs the communication.
Note: If Flight 19 had flown
West at this time [4:30 p.m.] they would have saved themselves.
4:45 p.m.
A
transmission is heard from Lt. Tayor stating that he was leading Flight 19
north northeast for a short time, then due north “to make sure they were not
over the Gulf of Mexico.”
Note: They left Fort
Lauderdale due east. To be over the Gulf they would have had to have flown due
West 110 miles passing over the landmass of Florida itself, a readily recognizable
landmark.
Mistaking
the Bahamas for the Keys led Lt. Tayor to assume he was over a body of water
110 miles in the opposite direction.
By
this point, personnel on the ground were becoming concerned about Flight 19.
The
day is turning to dusk and atmospheric interference was further deteriorating radio
transmission.
One
snippet that did get through was this complaint between two of the student pilots:
“If we would just fly west, we would get home.”
[This
would indeed have saved the crews.]
In
contrast, Lt. Taylor had them fly north and then veer slightly east—even further
out to sea.
5:15 p.m.
Lt.
Taylor is heard by the Port Everglades Boat Facility addressing his pilots, “We
are now heading west.”
He
further counsels that they should all “join up”, as soon as one of them ran out
of fuel, they would all go down together.
5:29 p.m.
The
sun sets [it is December if you will recall.]
Darkness
adds to the confusion.
Radio
transmission has deteriorated all day long.
5:50 p.m.
The
ComGulf Sea Frontier Evaluation Center is not certain, but may have pinpointed
Flight 19’s position.
They
have it plotted east of New Smyrna Beach, Florida and far to the north of the
Bahamas.
6:00 p.m.
Brief
radio contact is established with Flight 19.
Lt.
Taylor is advised to switch to emergency frequency 3,000 kilocycles.
He
refuses fearing that he and the other planes would fall out of communication.
With
deteriorating signal, interference from Cuban coastal commercial radio and the
inability of other coastal stations to receive the Fort Lauderdale training signal
easily this decision essentially shuts Flight 19 off from the world.
Consider:
Darkness. Radio Silence. A Flight Commander certain he is flying over a completely
different body of water.
6:04 p.m.
Lt.
Taylor is overheard ordering the other pilots to “turn around and go east again.”
Note: This order takes
Flight 19 further out to sea.
6:06 p.m.
He
repeats the order stating: “I think we have a better chance of being picked
up.”
Lt.
Taylor at this point is still under the impression is over the Gulf of Mexico.
[In
Part 2 we will cover the Rescue Efforts, The Tragedy, The Investigation, Where
the Legend Begins to Intrude and finally, discuss what all this has to do with Western Research. Stick with me, I promise the story is an infuriating
jaw-dropper.]
Resources
for Livin’ the Warrior Life, Not Just Readin’ About It
The
Black Box Warehouse
https://www.extremeselfprotection.com/
The
Indigenous Ability Blog
https://indigenousability.blogspot.com/
The
Rough ‘n’ Tumble Raconteur Podcast
https://anchor.fm/mark-hatmaker
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